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1. Introduction
In recent times, a growing number of central banks have commenced explicitly tar-
geting inflation as a means to improving economic performance. Associated with this
has been growing central bank credibility, as explicit targets have been achieved, and de-
viations from the targets have been clearly articulated (see Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin,
and Posen (1999) and Johnson (1998) for evidence of this).
Some have argued that central banks should go further. One characteristic of an
inflation target is that past mistakes are ignored: if inflation lies above or below the
target one period, the inflation target for the following period does not change. In a
world in which there are nominal rigidities, optimal policy will generally include some
degree of history dependence, so that current policy should condition on past mistakes.
One special case of a history dependent monetary policy that has received particu-
lar attention is price level targeting. Several recent papers have focused on the potential
benefits of the central bank targeting the price level when the central bank operates un-
der discretion, even if society’s loss function is specified in terms of inflation variability.
Svensson (1999), using a Neo Classical Phillips curve, argued that there is an advantage
to doing so provided the output gap is sufficiently persistent, and labeled this a “free
lunch.” Others have found even stronger support for price level targeting when agents
are forward looking. These papers utilize variants of the New Keynesian framework, out-
lined in Roberts (1995) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). This framework assumes
that changing prices is costly, so prices that are set today reflect future expectations of
inflation. For example, Dittmar and Gavin (2000) find that the inflation-output variabil-
ity trade-off is better with a price level target than an inflation target. They argue that
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adding a price level target with a small weight has little cost in terms of the real side of
the economy yet is beneficial in reducing inflation volatility.
Vestin (2000), using a similar framework, finds that price level targeting under discre-
tion outperforms inflation targeting under discretion. In some cases, he finds that price
level targeting under discretion can result in the same outcome as inflation targeting
under commitment, provided the parameters of the loss function are suitably adjusted.
In a related paper, Barnett and Engineer (2001) provide a summary of the literature
and consider a hybrid New Keynesian – Neo Classical Phillips curve. They argue that
optimal monetary policy precludes long-run price-level drift if inflation expectations are
sufficiently forward looking, among other contexts.
The existing literature has assumed that agents are fully rational and that the central
bank enjoys perfect credibility. Therefore whether a central bank has an inflation target
or a price level target, agents are assumed to know the target, and form expectations
that condition on it. Here the robustness of these results is considered. Suppose, for
example, that constructing rational expectations of inflation requires substantial costs.
Then a portion of economic agents may use rules-of-thumb to form expectations instead.
Alternatively, suppose that agents do not know or believe the stated target of the central
bank. They would then base their inflation expectations on a policy target that differs
from the true target of the central bank.
A number of examples of rule-of-thumb forecasting and imperfect credibility are
considered below. I find that in nearly all cases considered, the existing results are
sensitive. As the assumptions in the existing literature are relaxed, the “free lunch”
rapidly loses its culinary value, especially if inflation volatility has a high weight in
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society’s loss function. While the presence of rule-of-thumb forecasters or imperfect
credibility is typically costly with either an inflation or a price level target, it is especially
so with a price level target.
The basic model, demonstrating the potential role for price level targets, follows.
Section 3 discusses history-dependent monetary policy, section 4 considers the impact
of rule-of-thumb forecasting, while section 5 considers imperfect credibility. Conclusions
then follow.
2. A Simple New-Keynesian Model
Here I describe a simple linear-quadratic, forward-looking model similar to that in
Vestin (2000) in which price level targeting can play a role in improving the trade-off
between output and inflation variability faced by the central bank when monetary policy
is set under discretion. The economy is assumed to consist of a Phillips curve given by
πt = βEt(πt+1) + κxt + ut, (1)
where πt is inflation, xt is the output gap and ut is an exogenous shock term that
is known by the central bank. Expectations of future inflation are assumed rational,
and all variables are expressed in logs. For simplicity, xt can be considered the policy
instrument of the central bank.
An inflation-targeting central bank seeks to minimize a standard, quadratic loss
function given by
L = (1− β)Et
∞∑
i=0
βiLt+i,
Lt+i = (πt+i − π∗)2 + λx2t+i, (2)
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subject to (1), for some inflation target π∗. Note that I am assuming, as in Svensson
(1999) and Vestin (2000), that inflation targeting or price level targeting central banks
continue to pay attention to real variables in the economy, except in the special case
where λ = 0.
Under discretionary policy, the central bank is assumed to lack the means to commit
to future policy actions. Given the absence of state variables with inflation targeting,
optimal monetary policy will therefore minimize the period loss function, taking the form
xt =
κ(1− β)
κ2 + λ(1− β)π
∗ − κ
κ2 + λ
ut, (3)
while inflation evolves according to
πt =
κ2
κ2 + λ(1− β)π
∗ +
λ
κ2 + λ
ut. (4)
To examine monetary policy with a price level target, note that (1) may be rewritten
as
Et(pt+1 − p∗t+1) =
1 + β
β
(pt − p∗t )−
1
β
(pt−1 − p∗t−1)−
κ
β
xt − 1
β
ut +
1− β
β
π∗, (5)
where p∗t = p
∗
t−1 + π
∗. The appropriate quadratic period loss function is then given by
Lt+i = (pt+i − p∗t+i)2 + λx2t+i, (6)
where λ is appropriately scaled to reflect the difference between the magnitude of price
level and inflation rate volatility. In contrast to inflation targeting today’s policy affects
losses in future periods even without commitment technology, implying the presence of
state variables in the model. We follow the methodology of Currie and Levine (1993), and
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find that under optimal discretionary monetary policy, the paths of output and inflation
are defined by
xt = θ1[(pt−1 − p∗t−1) + ut] + θ2, (7)
pt = p∗t + φ1[(pt−1 − p∗t−1) + ut] + φ2, (8)
for θ1, θ2, φ1, φ2 given in Appendix 1.
We can now consider the policy frontiers obtained under either a price level or an
inflation target. The parameters considered here are the same as in Vestin (2000): κ =
1/3; β = 1; π∗ = 0; and 0 ≤ λ ≤ ∞. Note that in the limit, as β → 1, E(Lt) =Var(πt −
π∗)+Var(xt) with an inflation target, and E(Lt) =Var(pt − p∗t )+Var(xt) with a price
level target. To construct the policy frontier, the economy is simulated 1000 times for
100 periods for different levels of λ, and the average level of output and inflation volatility
in the final period is computed. 100 periods is sufficient to ensure that the results are
independent of the starting point, while averaging across 1000 simulations results in
policy frontiers that are virtually indistinguishable from those that may be obtained
analytically. While analytical solutions may be easily obtained for this base case, they
are difficult to obtain for some of the cases that follow; hence the reliance on numerical
results.
Figure 1 contains the policy frontiers for the base model. Over the entire range
of possible values of λ, a price level target results in a better trade-off between output
volatility and inflation volatility than an inflation target. Note that the graphs given here
are in terms of the standard deviations of output and inflation rather than the variances,
to aid interpretation. Hence the trade-off between output and inflation volatility with an
inflation target obtained here is a straight line, whereas Vestin (2000) obtained a convex
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relation.
Note also that the outcome with strict inflation targeting coincides with that when
there is strict price level targeting- in either case, inflation volatility equals zero, while
output volatility is at its highest level. Finally, for intermediate points, the desired level
of λ with a price level target will differ systematically from that with an inflation target.
As Vestin (2000) argues, this is as a result of both differences between the magnitudes
of price level volatility and inflation volatility and differences in the desired degree of
conservatism. Figure 2 plots the optimal choice of λ with a price level target against
that with an inflation target for each level of λ in society’s loss function. If society is
relatively concerned about inflation volatility, a price level targeting central bank should
have a smaller λ than an inflation targeting central bank (that is, be more conservative);
the reverse is true if society is relatively concerned about output volatility.
3. History-Dependent Monetary Policy
To illustrate the history dependence of a price level target, note that (8) above can
be rewritten as
πt = (φ1 − 1)(pt−1 − p∗t−1) + φ1ut + (φ2 + π∗). (9)
In comparison with the inflation path under inflation targeting given by (4), there is an
additional argument representing the difference between the price level target and the
realized price level in the previous period.
Also, with inflation targets, if agents discount the future and the central bank cares
about both inflation and output (β < 1 and λ > 0), the weight on π∗ in (4) is less than
one, and the expected long-run average inflation rate is less than π∗. By contrast, with
price level targeting the expected long-run average inflation rate is equal to π∗. To see
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this, (8) may be rewritten as
πt = π∗ + φ1ut + (φ1 − 1)
∞∑
i=1
φi1ut−i, (10)
which has an unconditional expectation of π∗. With price level targeting, the average
inflation rate may deviate substantially from π∗ in the short run, while the long run
average inflation rate will tend to π∗. This is because the further the price level deviates
from the target path, the greater will be the loss to the central bank, and therefore the
size of the monetary policy response to bring the price level back to the desired price
path (and the inflation rate back to π∗).
One important point to note is that price level targeting is just one example of a
history-dependent monetary policy, and not all history-dependent monetary policies are
equal. Suppose, for example, that the central bank were to seek to attain a time-varying
inflation target where the time-variation is sufficient to correct for past mistakes, so that
π∗t = π
∗
t−1 − πt−1 + π∗. (11)
One could think of this as a price level target, specified in inflation terms. Under these
circumstances, the optimal policy under discretion would result in the policy frontier in
Figure 3. Clearly the outcome is worse than with either an inflation target or a price
level target, over the full range of possible values of λ. The intuition behind this result
is that the expectations term in the Phillips curve is given by
Et(πt+1) = Et(pt+1)− pt. (12)
With a target expressed in inflationary terms and discretionary monetary policy, this
entire term is taken to be exogenous by the central bank. In contrast, if the target is
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expressed in price level terms, optimal discretionary policy takes account of the impact
of the current price level on future expectations (for example, from (8) with p∗t = 0,
Et(πt+1) = (φ1 − 1)pt). Therefore price level targeting incorporates more information
than inflation targeting, and results in a better trade-off. Note that this effect would
be obtained whenever expectations are forward looking. If expectations were backward
looking, then pursuing a price level target in inflation terms would result in no loss to
the central bank.
4. Rule-Of-Thumb Forecasting
The base result outlined above assumes that agents form rational expectations of
inflation. This assumes complete knowledge of the structure of the economy, the loss
function of the central bank, and the size of the shock term. Suppose that gathering this
information were costly. Then it is possible that optimizing agents may follow simple
rules-of-thumb in forming expectations. Two such cases are considered below, for β = 1.
When inflation expectations are biased towards current inflation
I first consider the case where a portion (1− ω) of agents expect future inflation to
be equal to its current level. Then aggregate inflation expectations are biased away from
their rational expectation towards the current inflation rate. This may result if some
agents have short memory, or perceive changes in the inflation rate to reflect a change
in the inflation target, for example.
In the New Keynesian framework, agents set prices today based on what they expect
inflation to be in the future. If some agents expect future inflation to be equal to current
inflation, they will set prices accordingly, and inflation expectations will appear to be less
forward looking. In what follows I will assume that the agents who are forward looking
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(including the central bank) are sophisticated in that they take account of the effect of
less sophisticated agents when forming their expectations. Replacing (1) above with the
following
πt = [ωEt(πt+1) + (1− ω)πt] + κxt + ut, (13)
and solving the model for different values of ω captures differing levels of credibility. The
policy frontiers are very qualitatively similar to those in Figure 1. Rewriting (13) as
πt = Et(πt+1) +
κ
ω
xt +
ut
ω
, (14)
one can see why. A reduction in credibility here increases the slope of the Phillips curve
and also the potency of inflation shocks. But these changes have equal effects on the
policy frontier with either a price level or an inflation target. Therefore the “free lunch”
remains. Figure 4 illustrates these results for differing values of ω.
When inflation expectations are biased towards long-run average
Now consider the case where some agents’ expectations of future inflation are biased
away from their rational expectation towards the long-run average inflation rate, while
others form inflation expectations that take into account the current policy target. This
may result if agents are not sophisticated enough to form rational expectations, or do
not know the model or size of the shock term.
In this model, which is linear and entails symmetric shock terms and additive un-
certainty, as β → 1 the average long-run rate of inflation is π∗ with either a price-level
or an inflation target. Replacing the Phillips Curve in (1) with
πt = ωEt(πt+1) + (1− ω)π∗ + κxt + ut (15)
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where (1 − ω) is the portion of unsophisticated agents, we can solve the model with an
inflation target and obtain
xt = − κ
κ2 + λ
ut, (16)
πt = π∗ +
λ
κ2 + λ
ut, (17)
which are identical to the case of ω = 1. This is because inflation targeting implies that
agents’ rational expectation of next period’s inflation rate is simply the inflation target,
which is also the long-run average inflation rate. Hence inflation expectations being
biased towards the long-run average inflation rate does not introduce any distortion into
the model.
To examine monetary policy with a price level target, note that (15) may be rewritten
as
Et(pt+1 − p∗t+1) =
1 + ω
ω
(pt − p∗t )−
1
ω
(pt−1 − p∗t−1)−
κ
ω
xt − 1
ω
ut. (18)
The price level path may then be solved using the method outlined in the appendix.
The policy frontiers for different values of ω are given in Figure 5. We see here
that as the portion of agents who focus only on the target when forming expectations
increases, the “free lunch” resulting from following a price level target diminishes.
5. Imperfect Credibility
The base result outlined in section 2 assumes that agents form rational expectations
that condition on the true central bank target. That is, the central bank has perfect
credibility. While there is some evidence that the credibility enjoyed by many central
banks has improved in recent years, few would believe that credibility is perfect. In
reality, if inflation were to remain away from the target for a period of time or were to
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move far from a constant target due to a particular realization of shocks, some agents
may interpret this as a change in the target. Also, if a central bank were to introduce
a price level target, even if it had previously enjoyed high credibility for an inflation
target, it would not necessarily enjoy immediate credibility for its new target. To the
extent that credibility must be attained for the new target, the expectations channel by
which price level targeting delivers superior output and inflation variability to inflation
targeting may be weakened.
One can think of credibility in a number of different ways, two of which will be
explored here. In each case, agents do not believe the target price path of the central
bank, and base their expectations on an alternative price path, in terms of either the
starting point or the growth rate.
When agents do not believe the starting point
With an inflation target, bygones are bygones, and so the starting point (in terms
of the price level) of the target price path is relevant for one period only. In contrast,
with a price level target, the starting point is relevant for all future periods. I consider
the situation where agents form expectations based on the belief that the starting point
of the price path differs from the true one by an amount δ. Therefore expectations are
based on a price level target of pˆ∗t where
pˆ∗t = p
∗
t + δ, (19)
and agents’ expectations consistently exceed the true target.
With an inflation target, the results are as in (3) and (4) above beyond the first
period. With a price level target, expectations are formed based on an incorrect target,
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and policy is set optimally, conditional on the forecasts. The solution to the policy
problem is outlined in Appendix 2.
Figure 6 shows the policy frontiers for δ = 0.001 (0.1%), δ = 0.01 (1%), and δ = 0.1
(10%) respectively. A small bias in the perceived anchor for the desired price level path
results in a rapid loss of the “free lunch” from pursuing a price level target, but has no
impact with an inflation target. This contrast points to the importance for a central
bank to credibly communicate the desired price path under a price level target.
Historically, examples that are consistent with this argument may be found from
the Gold Standard era. A gold standard may be viewed as equivalent to a price level
target in the sense that deviations from the standard must in principle be corrected by
future policy. As outlined in Capie and Collins (1983) and discussed in Smith (1998),
the United Kingdom left the Gold Standard during World War I, and sought to return
to it shortly after the end of the war. The process of returning was associated with a
large and persistent increase in unemployment (from below 5% to a peak of more than
20%), and a large decline in industrial production. The implication of my analysis here
is that to the extent that credibility played a role in this recession, it could have been
prevented by simply locking into a new Gold Standard at the post-war rate rather then
returning to the old gold standard.
When agents do not believe the price level growth rate
An alternative form of credibility that is important with either a price level target
or an inflation target is the growth rate. In the case of an inflation target, this will have
a negative impact on the policy frontier that is uniform (in expectation) over time. With
a price level target, the impact of imperfect credibility on output and inflation volatility
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will increase over time, as the perceived target and the actual target diverge. Clearly a
price level target will then generally be costly relative to an inflation target.
In the two examples above, imperfect credibility results in agents making systematic
errors in forecasting inflation. While this may be realistic in the short-run (for example,
immediately after adopting an inflation target), this is likely to be unrealistic in the
long run, since agents may be expected to learn about the inflation target over time. A
less extreme form of imperfect credibility, with agents making non-systematic errors in
predicting the target price level growth rate (π∗), may occur with a time-varying inflation
target. To be precise, suppose
Et(π∗t+1) = π
∗
t+1 + δt, δt ∼ N(0, σ2δ ). (20)
Many central banks allow for the idea of such a time-varying target in their inflation
objective. For example, the objective of the Australian central bank is to maintain
“consumer price inflation between 2 and 3 per cent, on average, over the cycle” (Reserve
Bank of Australia 2003), and the New Zealand central bank objective is “to keep future
CPI inflation outcomes between 1 per cent and 3 per cent on average over the medium
term” (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2002). Not only do these objectives leave some
discretion with the central bank in choosing the average inflation objective, they also
allow for discretion in the choice of the exact target at any given point in time.
With an inflation target, δt will be equivalent from the central bank’s point of view
to an additional inflation shock:
xt = − κ
κ2 + λ
(ut + δt), (21)
πt = π∗ +
λ
κ2 + λ
(ut + δt). (22)
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With a price level target, the price level the price and output paths may be solved in an
analogous fashion to Appendix 2; see Appendix 3 for details.
Figure 7 shows the policy frontiers for σδ = 0.0001 (0.01%), σδ = 0.001 (0.1%), and
σδ = 0.01 (1%). Once again, the results illustrate the fragility of the monetary policy
free lunch.
6. Conclusions
Price level targeting has been proposed as an alternative to inflation targeting that
may confer benefits where a central bank operates under discretion, even if society’s loss
function is specified in terms of inflation (instead of price level) volatility. This paper
demonstrates the sensitivity of this argument to the expectations formation process of
agents. If even a small portion of agents believes that inflation will continue in the future
at current levels, or does not fully understand the nature of a price level target, price level
targeting may in fact impose costs on society rather than benefits, especially if inflation
volatility has a high weight in society’s loss function. While rational expectations and
perfect credibility are generally beneficial with either a price level or an inflation target,
an inflation target is more robust to alternative assumptions.
These results suggest that caution should be exercised in considering a price level
target as the basis for monetary policy, unless society has preferences specified in terms
of price level (rather than inflation) volatility.
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Notation
πt inflation rate
β discount rate
xt output gap
ut cost-push shock
π∗ inflation target
λ weight on output objective in central bank loss function
κ slope of Phillips curve
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Appendix 1
To solve the price level targeting model under optimal discretionary policy, optimal
discretionary monetary policy will satisfy
Vt = minEt[Lt + βVt+1], (A1)
where the relevant terms of Vt are
Vt = γ1(pt−1 − p∗t−1)2 + 2γ2(pt−1 − p∗t−1) + ... (A2)
Following Currie and Levine (1993), the solution price-path may be written as
Et(pt+1 − p∗t+1) = φ1(pt − p∗t ) + φ2. (A3)
Equations (5) and (A3) imply that
(pt − p∗t ) =
1
1 + β − βφ1
(
(pt−1 − p∗t−1) + κxt + ut + [βφ2 − (1− β)π∗]
)
. (A4)
Substituting (A2) (iterated forward) and (A4) into (A1) and differentiating with respect
to xt yields the optimal discretionary policy rule
xt = θ1[(pt−1 − p∗t−1) + ut] + θ2, (A5)
θ1 =
−κ(1 + βγ1)
κ2(1 + βγ1) + λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 , (A6)
θ2 = −κ(1 + βγ1)[βφ2 − (1− β)π
∗] + κβγ2(1 + β − βφ1)
κ2(1 + βγ1) + λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 . (A7)
Substituting (A5) back into (A4) yields
(pt − p∗t ) =
λ(1 + β − βφ1)
κ2(1 + βγ1) + λ(1 + β − βφ1)2
(
(pt−1 − p∗t−1) + ut
)
+
λ(1 + β − βφ1)[βφ2 − (1− β)π∗]− κ2βγ2
κ2(1 + βγ1) + λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 . (A8)
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Iterating forward one period, taking expectations, and combining with (A3) yields
φ1 =
λ(1 + β − βφ1)
κ2(1 + βγ1) + λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 , (A9)
φ2 =
λ(1 + β − βφ1)[βφ2 − (1− β)π∗]− κ2βγ2
κ2(1 + βγ1) + λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 . (A10)
Finally, substituting (A2) iterated forward, (A5), and (A8) back into (A1) and equating
the relevant coefficients with (A2) yields
γ1 = (1 + βγ1)φ21 + λθ
2
1, (A11)
γ2 = (1 + βγ1)φ1φ2 + λθ1θ2 + βγ2φ1. (A12)
Solving these numerically, we then have the law of motion for both prices and output
and can calculate output and inflation volatility.
Appendix 2
Agent’s inflation expectations are formed under the assumption that the actual
target is equal to the perceived target. From (A8),
Et(pt+1 − pˆ∗t+1) = φ1(pt − pˆ∗t ) + φ2, (A13)
for φ1, φ2 outlined in appendix 1. Combining (A13) with the Phillips curve (5) yields
(pt−p∗t ) =
1
1 + β − βφ1
(
(pt−1−p∗t−1)+κxt+ut+[β(φ2+δ(1−φ1))−(1−β)π∗]
)
. (A14)
On the other hand, the central bank takes expectations as given and optimizes monetary
policy conditional on them. Their expectations will satisfy
Et(pt+1 − p∗t+1) = φ1(pt − p∗t ) + φˆ2, (A15)
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for some φˆ2. Combining (A15) with (5) and equating coefficients with (A14) implies
φˆ2 = φ2 + δ(1− φ1), (A16)
with corresponding new values implied for the other constant coefficients (θˆ2 and γˆ2) as
well. The paths of output and inflation are then functions of φ1, θ1, φˆ2, and θˆ2.
Appendix 3
In this case, (A13) implies that prices follow
Et(pt+1 − p∗t+1) = φ1(pt − p∗t ) + φ2 + φ1δt + (1− φ1)
∞∑
i=0
δt−i. (A17)
The relevant terms of the value function are
Vt = γ1(pt−1 − p∗t−1)2 + 2γ2(pt−1 − p∗t−1) + 2γ3(pt−1 − p∗t−1)
∞∑
i=0
δt−i..., (A18)
implying that
xt = θ1[(pt−1 − p∗t−1) + ut] + θ2 + θ3δt + θ4
∞∑
i=0
δt−i, (A19)
θ3 =
−βκ(1 + βγ1)φ1
κ2(1 + βγ1) + λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 , (A20)
θ4 =
−βκ[(1 + βγ1)(1− φ1) + γ3(1 + β − βφ1)]
κ2(1 + βγ1) + λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 , (A21)
γ3 = (1 + βγ1)φ1(1− φ1) + λθ1θ4 + βγ3φ1. (A22)
The solutions to φ1, φ2, θ1, θ2, γ1 and γ2 coincide with those in Appendix 1.
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Figure 1. Base Model
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Figure 3. Price Level Targeting in Inflation Terms
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Figure 4. Expectations Biased Towards Current Inflation
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Figure 5. Expectations Biased Towards Long-Run Average
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Figure 6. Agents Do Not Believe Starting Point
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Figure 7. Agents Do Not Believe Growth Rate (Random δ)
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